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The New VAT General Reverse-Charge Mechanism
Rita de la Feria
*
VAT fraud is, by its very nature, difficult to measure, but
there is little doubt over its significance. Since 2004, it
has often been asserted that fraud accounts for approxi-
mately 10% of VAT revenue within the EU1; and more
recent estimates of the VAT gap within the EU place it at
over EUR 150 billion, or 12.8% of the revenue collected,
of which EUR 50 billion is estimated to be connected to
organized fraud, fraud committed in large part by crim-
inal organizations.2 Similarly, in the UK, HMRC has
estimated the VAT Gap to be at 9.8% of total revenue
for 2015–2016, and whilst no estimates are offered for
overall VAT fraud, some types of fraud are quantified,
with Missing Trader Fraud (MTF) estimated to be 0.5%
of total revenue.3 Further estimates from other EU insti-
tutions, on specific types of VAT, portray a similar pic-
ture: Europol has reported that EU countries lose EUR
100 billion annually to that MTF; a perhaps all too
convenient figure but certainly one that symbolizes the
significance of the problem.4 These are, of course, mere
estimates: methodological difficulties are openly
acknowledged by tax administrations, and the lack of
comparable data regarding VAT fraud across the EU has
been identified as a significant limitation5; moreover, it is
also worth noting that the VAT compliance gap is a
measure of non-compliance – to include negligence,
avoidance, etc. – rather than just VAT fraud.6 Yet it is
reasonable to assume that, on the basis of these, the
share of revenue lost within the EU to VAT fraud is
quite considerable – and this is something that it is
also supported by evidence on the increased scale of
fraud, with some individual instances of fraud so massive
as to account in isolation for a significant amount of
revenue loss.7
Concerns over VAT fraud had been a constant
within EU countries’ tax administrations for many
years,8 yet it is undoubtedly the case that the eco-
nomic and financial crisis in 2008/2009 ensured that
combatting VAT fraud assumed greater priority within
the EU,9 not least due to the tax’s revenue gathering
potential,10 and its perceived neutrality on economic
growth. This renewed attention has manifested itself in
various administrative and legislative measures,
designed to tackle different types of VAT fraud,11 but
arguably no other type of VAT fraud has received as
much attention as MTF.
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National Accounts Data (2001) CESifo Working Papers 431 (Mar.
2001).
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M. Keen & J. Slemrod, Optimal Tax Administration IMF Working
Paper WP/17/8 (2017); N. Gemmel & J. Hasseldine, Taxpayer’s
Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A
Critique and a New Measure, 35 Fiscal Studies 275–96 (2014);
and K. Yiallourou, The Limitations of the VAT Gap Measurement,
28(4) EC Tax Rev. (2019).
7 In this regard, one of the most infamous cases was the so-called
CO2 fraud in 2008 and 2009, see Europol Press Release, Carbon
Credit Fraud Causes More than 5 Billion Euros Damage for European
Taxpayer (9 Dec. 2009); and P. Efstratios, Halting the Horses: EU
Policy on the VAT Carousel Fraud in the EU Emissions Trading System,
1 EC Tax Rev. 39–51 (2012). On other reported instances of
massive fraud, see Euro just EU-wide fuel oil and precious metals
VAT fraud and money laundering network dismantled, Press Release,
21 Dec. 2016; Europol, Eight Member States Take Action Against
International VAT Fraud, Press Release, 29 June 2016.
8 Due to what has been designated as a quasi-symbiotic connection
between the evolution of the EU VAT system and the development
of fraud, see C. Tussiot, La Fraude à la TVA, un Instrument de
Modernisation Fiscale, in La Fraude à la TVA 24 (C. Herbain ed.,
Larcier 2017).
9 IMF, supra n. 1, at 7.
10 Whilst VAT accounted for over 18% of total tax revenues of EU
Member States, in some Member States, such as Bulgaria and
Hungary, consumption taxes amount to as much 50% of total tax
revenue, see European Commission, Taxation Trends in the European
Union, 2017 Edition, 20–21, and 159.
11 For a typology of VAT fraud, see R. de la Feria, Tax Fraud and the
Rule of Law, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Papers WP/18/02 (2018).
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1 MISSING TRADER FRAUD
The year this Review was launched, 1991, was a crucial
year for EU VAT: the year in which the transitional VAT
system was approved12; it is also the year that intra-
Union VAT fraud, in its organized form,13 gained pro-
minence. Previous experience in the Benelux countries
with the Postpone Accounting System (PAS) – the
inspiration for the transitional VAT system that applied
from 1993 onwards to intra-Union transactions – 14 had
already indicated that the system that was about to be
put in place was susceptible to fraud.15 In particular,
research carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
seems to have alerted to the possibility that intra-EU
VAT fraud was about to establish itself in the form of
crime networks. The problem is said to have been
brought to the attention of the then Director-General of
the European Commission’s Internal Market, who
reportedly remarked indifferently that this form of orga-
nized cross-border crime was not the Commission’s
problem.16 Whether this is an accurate account of events
or not, it is indeed true that tax administrations had been
pointing out that the system was susceptible to fraud
since its inception in 1993. According to field experts,
the feared flow of mega frauds did not emerge immedi-
ately after 1 January 1993; instead criminal activity is
said to have started 18 to 24 months later: at first so-
called veterans tested the system and how easy it was to
cash the VAT by making a few loops across the border;
these were then followed by some legitimate traders17;
and finally the ‘legitimate’ and ‘criminal’ entrepreneurs
started to cooperate.18
The type of fraud that the transitional EU VAT system
has facilitated is what can be broadly designated as VAT
collected but not remitted to the Government. Whilst there
are various possible methods to commit this type of
fraud – such as false accounting, engineering bankruptcy
after collecting the tax but before it is remitted, and VAT
number hijacking – the most important is undoubtedly
the so-called carousel fraud, or MTF. EU legislation (no
longer in force) has previously defined a missing tra-
der as:
a trader registered as a taxable person for VAT purposes
who, potentially with a fraudulent intent, acquires or pur-
ports to acquire goods or services without payment of VAT
and supplies these goods or services with VAT, but does not
remit the VAT due to the appropriate national authority.19
MFT essentially exploits two key features of the EU VAT
system, one which is common to nearly all VAT systems
around the world, and another which is specific to the
EU VAT system: the destination principle, which
requires all exports to be VAT-free, with the tax collected
solely on imports (common to all); and the time delay in
the remittance of import VAT, coupled with the time gap
between the collection of the tax and its remittance on
internal supplies (specific to EU VAT). In its simplest
form, a trader – the MFT – collects VAT paid to him by a
customer without accounting or remitting to the tax
authorities, disappearing soon after, and before the
authorities realize what has occurred.20 There are
numerous variations to this basic model: the same
goods may move around different chains continuously,
with all the traders in the chain, or its employees,
involved, or at least aware that the fraud is occurring
(carousel fraud); or different goods are sold by fraudsters
to unsuspecting third parties, inserting themselves into
legitimate production chains (MTF). A more recent ver-
sion of the MTF is reportedly the insolvent trader, in
which instead of a missing trader, the scheme includes
an existing firm, which is stripped of any assets before
the tax authorities reach it. Whilst these fraud schemes
had traditionally operated within the EU, similar
schemes have now developed involving third countries,
taking advantage of VAT temporary exemption rules on
imports.21
2 ADDRESSING MISSING TRADER FRAUD:
REVERSE-CHARGE MECHANISM
Whilst evasion has been receiving growing attention over
the last few years, in terms of VAT fraud, MTF has been
the main focus of EU institutional attention since the late
1990s. This is partially due to the scale and organized
nature of the MTF, which often requires EU coordinated
action, partly because MTF is to a large extent a direct
consequence of arrangements put in place in 1993 for
intra-EU trade, and partially because of now well-known
12 As recently discussed in detail in R.de la Feria, The Definitive VAT
System: Breaking with Transition, 3 EC Tax Rev. 122–26 (2018).
13 On the distinction between organized VAT fraud, and other types
of VAT fraud, see de la Feria, supra n. 111.
14 On the connection between PAS and fraud see Y. Fedchyshyn,
Postponed Accounting in the European Union, 1 Int’l VAT Monitor
11–15 (2014).
15 R. Wolf, The Sad History of Carbon Carousels, 6 Int’l VAT Monitor
403 (2010); C. Amand & K. Boucquez, A New Defense for Victims of
EU Missing-Trader Fraud?, 4 Int’l VAT Monitor 234, 236 (2011).
16 See the remarkable account by P. van Duyne, VAT Fraud and the
Policy of Global Ignorance, 1 Eur. J. L. Reform 425–43, at 434
(1999).
17 For example, one of the biggest meat trader in the Netherlands, see
P. C. van Duyne, Organized Crime, Corruption and Power, 26 Crime,
L. & Social Change 201–38 (1997).
18 On the parasitic relationship between legitimate and organized
crime traders, and their modus operandi, see A. Aronowitz et al.,
Value-Added Tax Fraud in the European Union (Amsterdam: Kugler
Publications 1996).
19 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1925/2004 of 29 Oct., OJ L 331
13–18 (5 Nov. 2004).
20 Case C-354/03 Optigen and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2005:89, para. 8.
21 Under what is known as Customs Procedure 42, see European
Commission, Seventh report under Art. 12 of Regulation (EEC,
Euratom) n° 1553/89 on VAT collection and control procedures,
Commission Staff Working Document, SWD 38 final, 19 et seq.
(2014). See also F. Borselli, Pragmatic Policies to Tackle VAT Fraud in
the European Union, 5 Int’l VAT Monitor 333–42 (2008).
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connection between organized crime and organized tax
fraud, and its use as a financing method for illegal
activities.22 Whilst initially the response to MTF concen-
trated on enhancing administrative cooperation, atten-
tion soon turned to the expansion of the reverse-charge
mechanism (RCM) as a key anti-fraud measure.23
First introduced in 2006, under what is now
Article 199 VAT Directive, the mechanism applied
initially to construction work, supply of staff, waste
and immovable property.24 Its first extension was
approved four years later with the insertion of
Article 199a VAT Directive, which extended the
application of the RCM to mainly emissions
trade – although other industries had also been pro-
posed, such as telecommunications, microprocessors,
perfumes and precious materials.25 In 2013, comes
the second significant extension to the RCM with the
approval of a new Directive, which allowed Member
States to apply a RCM on an optional and temporary
basis, until 2018, to a wide range of supplies of,
including mobile phones, integrated circuit devices,
supplies of gas and electricity, telecom services, game
consoles, tablet PCs and laptops, cereals and indus-
trial crops, and raw and semi-finished metals.
Concurrently, and in addition to these provisions,
several Member States are granted authorizations
under Article 395 of the VAT Directive to apply the
RCM to specific goods and services, as summarized in
Table 1. It is also noteworthy that other derogations
have been recently requested and rejected by the
European Commission26; and that for some expired
derogations renewal was also rejected, either on the
basis of either the removal of the risk,27 or because
they were deemed to have an adverse effect on the
EU internal market as a whole.28
Table 1 Derogations for Introduction of Reverse-Charge
Mechanism
Member State Goods/Services
Austria Mobile phones/Microprocessors = or > EUR 5,000
(2010–2013)
Germany Mobile phones/Microprocessors = or > EUR 5,000
(2010–2013)
Hungary Raw food (2012–2014)
Supplies of staff (2018–2020)
Insolvency (2018–2021)
Italy Mobile phones/Microprocessors (2010–2013)
Latvia Timber (2006–2021)
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (2018)
Game consoles (2018)
Lithuania Timber/Insolvency procedure (2006–2021)
Netherlands Clothing (1992–2012)
Mobile phones/Microprocessors/Laptops and
tablets/Game consoles = or > EUR 10,000 (2013)
Telecommunication services (2013–2018)
Poland Hard drives (2017–2020)
Portugal Doorstep sales (2004–2015)
Romania Wood/Insolvency procedure (2010–2013)
Raw food materials/Wood (2011–2013)
Wood (2014–2019)
United
Kingdom
Mobile Phones/Microprocessors = or > EUR 5,000
(2010–2013)
The final step towards facilitating the introduction of RCM
as a method to combat fraud, came with the approval of the
so-called quick anti-fraud mechanism (QRM) in 2013,29
which enables immediate measures to be taken against
MTF, and whose purpose is not to replace the existing
derogation system, but rather it is limited to massive and
sudden fraud situations, in specific economic sectors, in a
particular Member States.30 It is against this background
that the proposal for a new generalized reverse-charge
mechanism started gained momentum.
3 NEW GENERALIZED REVERSE-CHARGE
MECHANISM
Supported, and actively advocated, by some Member
States for some years, the formal tabling of the legislative
proposal for a generalized RCM came in 2016.31
22 European Court of Auditors, supra n. 5; Europol, supra n. 4; and
Europol, Eight Member States Take Action Against International VAT
Fraud, Press Release (29 June 2016).
23 See K. Lind, Reverse Charging: The Best Possible Solution for
Preventing VAT Fraud, 2(2) World J. VAT/GST L. 97–115 (2013).
24 Originally inserted into the Sixth VAT Directive as Art. 21(2)(c) by
Council Directive 2006/69/EC of 24 July 2006, OJ L221, 9 (12
Aug. 2006).
25 Council Directive 2010/23/EU of 16 Mar. 2010, OJ L72, 1 (20 Mar.
2010). See also Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive
2006/112/EC as regards an optional and temporary application of the
reverse charge mechanism in relation to supplies of certain goods and
services susceptible to fraud, COM(2009) 511 final (29 Sept. 2009).
26 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
Council in accordance with Art. 395 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC,
COM(2013) 105 (28 Feb. 2013), rejecting a request from Romania;
and Commission implementing Decision 2013/769/EU of 11 Dec.
2013, OJ L341 68 (18 Dec. 2013), rejecting a request from
Hungary.
27 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
Council in accordance with Art. 395 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC,
COM(2013) 283 final (16 May 2013), as regards Germany.
28 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
Council in Accordance with Art. 395 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC,
COM(2013) 317 (29 May 2013), as regards the UK.
29 Council Directive 2010/45/EU of 13 July 2010, OJ L 189 1–8 (22
July 2010). Its application has now been extended to 2020 by
Council Directive (EU) 2018/1695 of 6 Nov. 2018, OJ L 282 5–7
(12 Nov. 2018).
30 B. J. M. Terra, The European Quick Reaction Mechanism Against VAT
Fraud, 1(2) World J. VAT/GST L. 185–90 (2012); and I. Lejeune et
al., Quick Reaction Mechanism Against EU VAT Fraud, 2 Int’l VAT
Monitor 94–98 (2013).
31 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive amending
Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax as
regards the temporary application of a generalised reverse charge
mechanism in relation to supplies of goods and services above a certain
threshold, COM(2016) 811 final (21 Dec. 2016).
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Although the Commission also presented two other leg-
islative proposals at around the same time, aimed at
tackling VAT fraud more fundamentally, namely on
administrative cooperation, on the definitive VAT system
for intra-Union trade,32 the generalized RCM was seen,
in essence, as an interim measure, aimed at addressing
the urgent concerns of some Member States as regards
MTF. Finally approved in late 2018, the most significant
(only?) advantage of the new mechanism is the potential
eliminating MTF.33 The disadvantages, however, are
numerous. At a more immediate level, it will increase
administrative and compliance costs, by requiring
increased reporting, introducing distinctions between
business to business (B2B) and business to consumer
(B2C) transactions, and introducing threshold
consideration.34 More fundamentally, however, the
main disadvantage is that it effectively transforms the
VAT into a de facto Retail Sales Tax (RST).
VAT, like any other type of tax, is vulnerable to fraud.
Traditionally the inclusion of consumption taxes in the
tax mix is seen as spreading the risk of enforcement, and
VAT perceived as less susceptible to fraud than its prin-
cipal alternative, and economically equivalent, the
RST.35 This comparative advantage is attributable to
the multi-stage nature of VAT, which requires the tax
to be collected on business-to-business transactions, but
also allows businesses to credit the VAT paid on their
purchases (inputs) against the VAT charged on their
sales (outputs). This multi-stage collection process
ensures: (1) that buyers of intermediate goods have
opposing interests to the sellers, thus reducing the
scope for evasion; and, (2) that the risk of evasion is
spread across the different elements of the production
chain. The incentive for traders to ensure that suppliers
provide them with credit-allowing invoices, what is
usually designated as third party reporting, guarantees
that VAT is, to some extent, self-enforceable.36 On the
contrary, RSTs lack the multi-stage collection feature,
which essentially means that (1) all the risk of evasion
is concentrated in the last stage of the production chain,
namely the sale to the final consumer, which is precisely
one of the most vulnerable, and (2) the third-party
reporting is limited to that same stage, where the buyer
has a similar interested to the seller, and thus there is a
significant risk of, at best, disinterest in the tax element,
and at worst the scope for collusion.
It is true that the self-enforceability of the VAT is
somewhat illusory: there is some evidence that ‘bad
production chains’ can form, particularly in developing
countries37; and more importantly, self-enforceability
does not cover all aspects of the production chain, falling
namely in last stage of that chain, where the final con-
sumer has no incentive to ask for the invoice; and after
the registered businesses receive the invoice, when there
is no incentive to ensure that VAT has actually been
remitted. It is precisely at these two moments that
fraud tends to occurs. Yet, the risk in a RST is much
higher, as it completely lacks any self-enforceability ele-
ments. In that context, whilst recognizing the vulner-
ability of VAT at those moments where self-
enforceability is absent is crucial to combatting VAT
fraud, responding by essentially removing the self-enfor-
ceability features of the VAT, and effectively transform-
ing it into a de facto RST, seems ill-advised: rather like
throwing out the baby with the bathwater.38 A general-
ized reverse-charge mechanism may well kill MTF, but
in the process it may also give birth to a widespread,
more fundamental, VAT compliance problem that will be
much harder to either contain, or combat. Let us hope it
does, indeed, stay temporary.
32 Both now adopted, see Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1541 of 2
Oct. 2018, OJ L 259 1–11 (16 Oct. 2018); and Council Directive
(EU) 2018/1910 of 4 Dec. 2018, OJ L 311 3–7 (7 Dec. 2018).
33 Council Directive (EU) 2018/2057 of 20 Dec. 2018, OJ L 329 3–7
(27 Dec. 2018). See also B. Wohlfahnt, The Future of the European
VAT System, 6 Int’l VAT Monitor 387–95, at 392 (2011).
34 M. Lamensch, Are ‘Reverse-Charge’ and the ‘One-Stop-Scheme’
Efficient Ways to Collect VAT on Digital Supplies?, 1(1) World J.
VAT/GST Law 1–20 (2012).
35 In fact the decreased susceptibility of fraud is the main reason for
the superiority of VAT over RST, since economically they are
identical taxes, see S. Cnossen, VAT and RST: A Comparison, 35(3)
Can. Tax J. (1987); M. Gillis, P. Mieszkowski & G. Zodrow, Indirect
Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and Differences Among Alternative
Approaches, 51(4) Tax L. Rev. 725−74 (1996); G. R. Zodrow, The
Sales Tax, the VAT, and Taxes in Between—or, Is the Only Good NRST
a ‘VAT in Drag’?, 52(3) National Tax J. 429–42 (1999); C. H. E
McLure & W. Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State
Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 State Tax
Notes 721–35 (2004); S. Fedeli, The Effects of the Interaction
Between Direct and Indirect Taxation: The Cases of VAT and RST,
53(3–4) Pub. Fin., 385−418 (2003); J. Slemrod, Does It Matter Who
Writes the Check to the Government? The Economics of Tax Remittance,
LXI(2) National Tax J. 251–75 (2008); R. Bird & P. P. Gendron,
The VAT in Developing and Transitional Economies 32–33 (CUP
2007); and S. Cnossen, The Technical Superiority of VAT or RST, in
Australian Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect, in Australian Tax
Reform in Retrospect and Prospect 325–59 (C. Evans & R. Krever
eds, Thomson Reuters Australia 2009).
36 On the self-enforceability of VAT, see M. Waseem, Information,
Asymmetric Incentives, or Withholding? Understanding the Self-
Enforcement of Value-Added Tax, Oxford University Centre for
Business Taxation Working Papers WP 18/08 (2018).
37 Empirical evidence of this phenomenon has been found in Brazil,
e.g. see A. de Paula & J. A. Scheinkman, Value-Added Taxes, Chain
Effects and Informality, 2 American Econ. J.: Macroeconomics 195–
221 (2010).
38 See R. M. Bird, Decentralizing Value Added Taxes in Federations and
Common Markets 12 Bull. for Int’l Tax’n 655–72, at 667 (2013).
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